CASO: EL PASO GAS CORPORATION VS NORTHWEST

Caso en el que el Paso Gas Corporation dominante de un mercado compra la compañía Northwest que se iniciaba en el mismo rubro, es decir que El PGC al ver amenazado su mercado decidió comprar a la empresa que recién se iniciaba, para proteger y mantener su mercado, esta conducta fue considerada por la Corte Americana como Ilegal porque buscaba evitar la competencia en potencia.
Una fusión también puede generar este efecto y realmente se considera ilegal porque lo que busca es :
1) Concentrar el poder en el adquiriente o comprador.
2) Generar efectos monopolicos en base a su posición dominante del mercado haciendo que el competidor comercial acepte el trato.
3) Buscar confundir su patrimonio con ele incorporado, haciendo desaparecer su nacimiento.


UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
EL PASO NATURAL GAS COMPANY and Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation, Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 143-57.

United States District Court D. Utah, C. D.
June 21, 1968.
As Amended August 29, 1968.

*4 *5 Joseph J. Saunders, John H. Dougherty, Milton J. Grossman, Robert D. Paul, Attys., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Leon M. Payne, A. H. Ebert, Jr., P. Dexter Peacock, Andrews, Kurth, Campbell & Jones, Houston, Tex., Gregory A. Harrison, David F. Mackie, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco, Cal., G. Scott Cuming, General Counsel, E. G. Najaiko, Asst. General Counsel El Paso Natural Gas Co., El Paso, Tex., Dennis McCarthy, Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant.

Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., H. J. Lewkowitz, Asst. Atty. Gen. State of Arizona, Phoenix, Ariz., for intervenors State of Arizona ex rel. The Arizona Corporation Commission, Arizona Public Service Co., Tucson Gas & Electric Co.

Nicholas H. Powell, Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix, Ariz., for Arizona Public Service Co.

A. Y. Holesapple, Holesapple, Conner, Jones, McFall & Johnson, Tucson, Ariz., for Tucson Gas & Electric Co.

Louis H. Callister, Callister, Kesler & Callister, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Arizona Public Service Co. and Tucson Gas & Electric Co.

John T. Miller, Jr., Washington, D. C., for State of Arizona ex rel. Arizona Corporation Commission, Arizona Public Service Co., Tucson Gas & Electric Co.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty.Gen. of State of California, William M. Bennett, Sp. *6 Counsel to Atty. Gen., Iver E. Skjeie, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, Cal., for the People of State of California.

James E. Faust, Salt Lake City, Utah, for California-Pacific Utilities Co.

Mary Moran Pajalich, J. Calvin Simpson, Sheldon Rosenthal, San Francisco, Cal., for Public Utilities Commission of State of California.

Richard B. Hooper, Wilbert C. Anderson, Jones, Grey, Kehoe, Bayley, Hooper & Olsen, Seattle, Wash., for Cascade Natural Gas Corporation.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., State of Colorado, Robert Lee Kessler, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Colorado, Denver, Colo., for State of Colorado ex rel. Colorado Public Utilities Commission.

Allan G. Shepard, Atty. Gen., State of Idaho, Larry D. Ripley, Asst. Atty. Gen., assigned to Idaho Public Utilities Commission, c/o Idaho Public Utilities Commission, Boise, Idaho, for State of Idaho ex rel. Idaho Public Utilities Commission.

Claude Marcus, Marcus, Leggat & Marcus, Boise, Idaho, for Intermountain Gas Co.

Joseph S. Jones, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Mountain Fuel Supply Co.

Harvey Dickerson, Atty. Gen. of Nevada, John Sheehan, Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson City, Nev., for Public Service Commission of Nevada.

Boston E. Witt, Atty. Gen. of New Mexico, Dennis R. Francish, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, N. M., for New Mexico Public Service Commission.

Harold W. Pierce, Portland, Ore., for Northwest Natural Gas Co.

Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen. of Oregon, Richard W. Sabin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, Ore., for State of Oregon ex rel. The Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon.

Richard H. Peterson, Frederick T. Searls, Malcolm H. Furbush, Stanley T. Skinner, San Francisco, Cal., for Pacific Gas and Electric Co.

Sherman Chickering, C. Hayden Ames, Donald J. Richardson, Jr., Chickering & Gregory, San Francisco, Cal., for San Diego Gas & Electric Co.

Rollin E. Woodbury, William E. Marx, Los Angeles, Cal., R. Clyde Hargrove, Shreveport, La., for Southern California Edison Co.

John Ormasa, Harvey L. Goth, Los Angeles, Cal., Neil R. Olmstead, Olmstead, Stine & Campbell, Ogden, Utah, of counsel, for Southern California Gas Co. and Southern Counties Gas Company of California.

Charles H. McCrea, Vice-President and General Counsel, Las Vegas, Nev., for Southwest Gas Corporation.

Edward F. Richards, Gustin & Richards, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Utah Gas Service Co.

Phil L. Hansen, Atty. Gen., State of Utah, H. Wright Volker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, Utah, for Utah Public Service Commission.

Cartano, Botzer & Chapman, John W. Chapman, Seattle, Wash., Draper, Sandack & Saperstein, A. Wally Sandack, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Washington Natural Gas Co.

John J. O'Connell, Atty. Gen., Frank P. Hayes, Robert E. Simpson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, Wash., for Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission.

Robert L. Simpson, Paine, Lowe, Coffin, Herman & O'Kelly, Spokane, Wash., A. Wally Sandack, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Washington Water Power Co.

Don M. Empfield, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. State of Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyo., for Public Service Commission of Wyoming.

Richard A. Solomon, General Counsel, Washington, D. C., for Federal Power Commission, amicus curiae.

Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, Utah, Frank Shafroth, Grant, Shafroth, Toll & McHendrie, Denver, Colo., David T. Searls, Vinson, Elkins, Weems & Searls, Houston, Tex., for Aspen Pipeline Co.

David K. Watkiss, Salt Lake City, Utah, Risher M. Thornton, III, Midland, Tex., James D. McKinney, Washington, D. C., for Colonial Group.

*7 Walter W. Sapp, General Counsel, Colorado Springs, Colo., James L. White, William J. Carney, Jr., Holland & Hart, Denver, Colo., Macoy A. McMurray, McKay & Burton, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Colorado Interstate Gas Co.

B. J. Bradshaw, William Howard Wolf, Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman, Bates & Jaworski, Houston, Tex., Calvin A. Behle, Parsons, Behle, Evans & Latimer, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Continental Pacific Corporation.

Oscar W. Moyle, Jr., Hardin A. Whitney, Jr., O. Wood Moyle, III, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Great Lakes Carbon Corporation.

Wm. H. Ferguson, Thomas J. Greenan, Ferguson & Burdell, Seattle, Wash., Ted Stockmar, Holme, Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colo., for Pacific Western Pipeline Corporation.

C. Keefe Hurley, Earle C. Cooley, Hale & Dorr, Boston, Mass., Brigham E. Roberts, Rawlings, Roberts & Black, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Paradox Production Corporation.

C. Preston Allen, S. J. Quinney, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, Utah, Thompson, Knight, Simmons & Bullion, Dallas, Tex., George S. Dibble, Jr., Cody, Wyo., for Joseph Rosenblatt et. al., Husky Oil Co. Group.

Alfred H. Stoloff, Phillips, Coughlin, Buell & Phillips, Portland, Ore., Fred D. Turnage, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Washington, D. C., for Western States Pipeline Corporation.

CHILSON, District Judge.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The following is a brief summary of the facts and background which lead to the present phase of this litigation. A more detailed account is found in three decisions of the Supreme Court:

California v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482, 82 S.Ct. 901, 8 L.Ed.2d 54; United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. et al., 376 U.S. 651, 84 S.Ct. 1044, 12 L.Ed.2d 12; Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. et al., 386 U.S. 129, 87 S.Ct. 932, 17 L.Ed.2d 814. (Referred to as Cascade)

Prior to the year 1954, El Paso Natural Gas Company (El Paso) was engaged in the business of transporting natural gas interstate to the California border for sale to distributors who distributed the gas to users in southern California. At that time, El Paso was the sole out-of-state supplier to the California market.

In 1954, Pacific Northwest (PNW) received the approval of the Federal Power Commission to construct and operate a pipeline from the San Juan Basin in New Mexico to the State of Washington to supply gas to the then unserved Pacific Northwest area. The pipeline was completed and service was begun in 1956.

PNW had obtained authorization to receive large quantities of Canadian gas and, in addition, had acquired Rocky Mountain gas reservoirs along its route and gas reserves in the San Juan Basin. In 1954, PNW tried to enter the rapidly expanding California market by transportation of Canadian gas to Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (PG & E) in northern California, and the effort was renewed in 1955. In 1956, PNW negotiated with Southern California Edison Co. (Edison) to supply it with natural gas.

Although PNW had no pipeline into California and its efforts to enter the California market were unsuccessful, these efforts were a substantial competitive factor in the California market and led to a price reduction and other concessions to the ultimate benefit of Edison.

El Paso had been interested in acquiring PNW since 1954. The first offer from El Paso was in December 1955, an offer PNW rejected. Negotiations were resumed by El Paso in the summer of 1956, while PNW was still trying to obtain entry to the California market.

In November of 1956, El Paso offered to exchange El Paso shares for PNW shares. This offer was accepted by *8 PNW directors and by May 1957, El Paso had acquired 99.8 percent of PNW's outstanding stock.

In July 1957, the Department of Justice filed suit against El Paso in the U. S. District Court for the District of Utah charging that the stock acquisition violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

In August 1957, El Paso applied to the Federal Power Commission for permission to acquire the assets of PNW, and on December 23, 1959, the Commission approved and the merger of PNW with El Paso was effected on December 31, 1959. California, an intervenor in the proceedings, obtained a review by the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission (111 U.S.App.D.C. 226, 296 F.2d 348). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and set aside the Commission's approval, holding that it should not have acted until the District Court had passed on the Clayton Act issues. California v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482, 82 S.Ct. 901 (supra).

Meanwhile, (in October 1960) the United States amended its Complaint in the District Court so as to include the asset acquisition by merger in the charge of violation of the Clayton Act. Upon trial of this action, the District Court found for El Paso; the U. S. appealed; the Supreme Court, on review of the record which was composed largely of undisputed evidence, concluded that the effect of the acquisition "may be substantially to lessen competition" within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to the District Court "to order divestiture without delay." United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Company et al., 376 U.S., p. 651, 84 S.Ct. 1044 (supra).

Upon remand to the District Court, motions to intervene by the State of California, Southern California Edison Company, (Edison) and Cascade Natural Gas Company (Cascade Company) were denied, and the District Court entered a decree of divestiture which had been agreed upon by the Department of Justice and El Paso.

California, Edison, and Cascade Company appealed from the denial of their motions to intervene. The Supreme Court in Cascade Natural Gas Corporation v. El Paso Natural Gas Company et al., 386 U.S. 129, 87 S.Ct. 932 (supra) reversed the District Court and remanded with directions to allow each appellant to intervene as a matter of right and that the proceedings be reopened to give California, Edison, and Cascade Company an opportunity to be heard as intervenors.

The Court also held that the agreed decree, entered by the District Court, was not in accord with the Supreme Court's mandate in 376 U.S. 651, 84 S. Ct. 1044 (supra) which required that PNW, or a new company, be at once restored to a position where it could compete with El Paso in the California market; ordered the District Court to vacate the orders of divestiture previously entered; "have de novo hearings on the type of divestiture" the Court envisioned and made plain in its opinion in 376 U.S. 651, 84 S.Ct. 1044; directed "* * * there be a divestiture without delay * * *"; suggested guidelines that should be followed in ordering the divestiture and ordered that a different District Judge be assigned to hear the case.

PROCEEDINGS SINCE CASCADE

Caso UNITED STATES VS. MATSUSHITA CORPORATION JAPAN

Este caso se instaura a causa de una denuncia de los comerciantes americanos que decían que la Matsushita había vendido sus productos durante 20 años son Predatory prices, estos preciso, decían los comerciantes, lea habían ocasionado perjuicio por eso no podían desarrollarse, conocido el caso, La Corte dijo que el argumento no tenia sustento porque no tenia sentido que se reduzca un precio sin buscar recuperar ese valor, en forma posterior y recuperar el valor de 20 años de subsidio era irracional. Con este caso la corte sentó el principio de que la recuperación era un elemento esencial, también sentó el principio de que un comerciante no podía pretender cubrir su ineficacia con el argumento de los precios devastadores y que al final el tema iba por una mejora en la estructura del costo marginal.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. ZENITH RADIO, 475 U.S. 574 (1986)

475 U.S. 574

MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD, ET AL. v. ZENITH RADIO CORP. ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 83-2004. Argued November 12, 1985 -- Decided March 26, 1986

Petitioners are 21 Japanese corporations or Japanese-controlled American corporations that manufacture and/or sell "consumer electronic products" (CEPs) (primarily television sets). Respondents are American corporations that manufacture and sell television sets. In 1974, respondents brought an action in Federal District Court, alleging that petitioners, over a 20-year period, had illegally conspired to drive American firms from the American CEP market by engaging in a scheme to fix and maintain artificially high prices for television sets sold by petitioners in Japan and, at the same time, to fix and maintain low prices for the sets exported to and sold in the United States. Respondents claim that various portions of this scheme violated, inter alia, §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, and § 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act. After several years of discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment on all claims. The District Court then directed the parties to file statements listing all the documentary evidence that would be offered if the case went to trial. After the statements were filed, the court found the bulk of the evidence on which respondents relied was inadmissible, that the admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged conspiracy, and that any inference of conspiracy was unreasonable. Summary judgment therefore was granted in petitioners' favor. The Court of Appeals reversed. After determining that much of the evidence excluded by the District Court was admissible, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in granting a summary judgment and that there was both direct and circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy. Based on inferences drawn from the evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by excess profits obtained in the Japanese market.

Held:

The Court of Appeals did not apply proper standards in evaluating the District Court's decision to grant petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Pp. 582-598.

(a) The "direct evidence" on which the Court of Appeals relied - petitioners' alleged supracompetitive pricing in Japan, the "five company rule" by which each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five American distributors, and the "check prices" (minimum prices fixed by agreement with the Japanese Government for CEPs exported to the United States) insofar as they established minimum prices in the United States - cannot by itself give respondents a cognizable claim against petitioners for antitrust damages. Pp. 582-583.

(b) To survive petitioners' motion for a summary judgment, respondents must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioners entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer a cognizable injury. If the factual context renders respondents' claims implausible, i. e., claims that make no economic sense, respondents must offer more persuasive evidence to support their claims than would otherwise be necessary. To survive a motion for a summary judgment, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act must present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently. Thus, respondents here must show that the inference of a conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed respondents. Pp. 585-588.

(c) Predatory pricing conspiracies are by nature speculative. They require the conspirators to sustain substantial losses in order to recover uncertain gains. The alleged conspiracy is therefore implausible. Moreover, the record discloses that the alleged conspiracy has not succeeded in over two decades of operation. This is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist. The possibility that petitioners have obtained supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market does not alter this assessment. Pp. 588-593.

(d) Mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct that the antitrust laws are designed to protect. There is little reason to be concerned that by granting summary judgment in cases where the evidence of conspiracy is speculative or ambiguous, courts will encourage conspiracies. Pp. 593-595.

(e) The Court of Appeals erred in two respects: the "direct evidence" on which it relied had little, if any, relevance to the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy, and the court failed to consider the absence of a plausible motive to engage in predatory pricing. In the absence of any rational motive to conspire, neither petitioners' pricing practices, their conduct in the Japanese market, nor their agreements respecting prices and distributions in the American market sufficed to create a "genuine issue for trial" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). On remand, the Court of Appeals may consider whether there is other, unambiguous evidence of the alleged conspiracy. Pp. 595-598.

723 F.2d 238, reversed and remanded.

POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and MARSHALL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 598.

CASO ALCOA

Un caso que a definido la división del concepto, es el caso Alcoa una corporación poderosa en el rubro de aluminio, había introducido al mercado su envase de aluminio, este envase tenia ciertas características que lo hacia único en el mercado, por su parte también Alcoa era el mejor producto, entonces dominaba el 30% de ese mercado. En esa condición Alcoa trato de ejercitar ese monopolio del mercado, introduciendo su envase a un precio que era inferior al precio nacional, ese ejercicio de poder se considera monopolico, significaba pretender ejercitar el poder sobre un mercado para lograr con ese poder popularizar un tipo de envase, ya que la palanca fundamental era su dominio del 30% del mercado, la corte considero es conducta como ilegal.

Facts

During the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Justice Department charged Alcoa with illegal monopolization and demanded that the company be dissolved. Trial began on June 1, 1938. The trial judge dismissed the case four years later. The government appealed. Two years later in 1944, the Supreme Court announced that it could not assemble a quorum to hear the case so it referred the matter to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In the following year, Learned Hand wrote the opinion for the Second Circuit.
Alcoa argued that if it was in fact deemed a monopoly, it acquired that position honestly, through outcompeting other companies through greater efficiencies.

Judgment

Judge Learned Hand held that he could consider only the percentage of the market in "virgin aluminum" for which Alcoa accounted. Alcoa had argued that it was in the position of having to compete with scrap. Even if the scrap was aluminum that Alcoa had manufactured in the first instance, it no longer controlled its marketing. But Hand defined the relevant market narrowly in accord with the prosecution's theory. Hand applied a rule concerning practices that are illegal per se. It did not matter how Alcoa became a monopoly, since its offense was simply to become one. In Hand's words,

“

It was not inevitable that it should always anticipate increases in the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply them. Nothing compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling its capacity before others entered the field. It insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel.

”

Hand acknowledged the possibility that a monopoly might just happen, without anyone's having planned for it. If it did, then there would be no wrong, no liability, and no need to remedy the result. But that acknowledgement has generally been seen as an empty one in the context of the rest of the opinion, because of course rivals in a market routinely plan to outdo one another, at the least by increasing efficiency and appealing more effectively to actual and potential customers. If one competitor succeeds through such plans to the extent of 90% of the market, that planning can be described given Hand's reasoning as the successful and illegal monopolization of the market.

Significance

Hand remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination of the remedy. In 1947, Alcoa made the argument to the court that there were two effective new entrants into the aluminum market – Reynolds and Kaiser – as a result of demobilization after the war and the government's divestiture of defense plants. In other words, the problem had solved itself and no judicial action would be required. On this basis, the district court judge ruled against divestiture in 1950, but the court retained jurisdiction over the case for five years, so that it could look over Alcoa's shoulder and ensure that there was no re-monopolization.
Until 1950, Alcoa was concerned with its domestic market, while its Canadian subsidiary Aluminum Limited (Alcan) took care of the international markets. Alcoa, Reynolds, and Kaiser were soon joined in the growing market by Anaconda Aluminum Company, a subsidiary of the copper-industry giant. In 1958 Harvey Machine Tools Company began primary aluminum production, marking the end of Alcoa's monopoly over the process which had led to its domination of the American market.
Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan criticized United States v. Alcoa as a young man in 1966, in an essay published in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. In it, he argues that antitrust law should only condemn coercive monopolies:

“

ALCOA is being condemned for being too successful, too efficient, and too good a competitor. Whatever damage the antitrust laws may have done to our economy, whatever distortions of the structure of the nation's capital they may have created, these are less disastrous than the fact that the effective purpose, the hidden intent, and the actual practice of the antitrust laws in the United States have led to the condemnation of the productive and efficient members of our society because they are productive and efficient.[1]

CASO: VENDEDORES DE TRIGO

Los vendedores de trigo se pusieron de acuerdo para fijar el precio del trigo, sin embargo ese precio fijado era un precio que salía de la bolsa de futuros y opciones mercado de comodities, habían acordado que el precio aplicable a sus operaciones seria el precio resultante de las operaciones del mercado de comodities del día en cuestión.

CASO: PETROLERAS

En el cual en la época de crisis del petróleo el precio de la gasolina había subido demasiado y los distribuidores no tenían capacidad de almacenaje por tanto un grupo de empresas se reunió para almacenar todo el excedente y decidió que no vendería el excedente hasta que el precio se adecue a los requerimientos que le convenga, la Corte al conocer el tema considero que el acuerdo no era ilegal porque no buscaba fijar precios sino colocar un producto en el mercado cuando las condiciones convengan al vendedor comerciante. Si el acuerdo no influye en el mercado no es ilegal per se.

CASO: UNITED STATUS VS ADISSION PIPE

Addison Pipe era una compañía de fabricación de ductos que había participado en la iniciativa de celebrar un contrato entre fabricantes de ductos, por el cual los fabricantes se distribuían el mercado, de modo tal que cada fabricante se quedaba con una porción de mercado que le pertenecía en las licitaciones que convocaba el Estado, resultaba fácil verificar el cumplimiento del acuerdo porque las licitaciones eran publicas y se sabían el precio que las partes ofrecían, ese precio siempre era superior al precio que ofrecía aquel fabricante que no era parte del acuerdo, al verse perjudicado denuncio esa conducta.


The defendants were pipemakers who were operating in agreement, so that when municipalities offered projects available to the lowest bidder, all companies but the one designated would overbid, thus guaranteeing the success of the designated low bidder (although it was still possible for a company outside the group to win).

The defendants asserted that this was a reasonable restraint of trade, and that the Sherman Act could not have meant to prevent such restraints.

Court of Appeals (6th circuit)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that it would be impossible for the Sherman Act to prohibit every restraint of trade, for that would even encompass employment contracts which, by their nature, restrain the employee from working elsewhere during the time that they are being paid to work for the employer. Therefore, reasonable restraints were permitted, but this would only apply if the restraint was ancillary to the main purpose of the agreement. No conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless:

it is ancillary to the main purpose of the lawful contract; and
it is necessary to protect enjoyment of legit fruits or to protect from dangers.

If the primary purpose is to restrain trade, then the agreement is invalid, and in this case, the restraint was direct, and therefore invalid.

The opinion was written by Chief Judge William Howard Taft (who later became President of the United States, and then Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court). Taft's reasoning was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court as the proper interpretation of the Sherman Act.
Supreme Court

This case was appealed to the Supreme Court as Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).[1] However, on appeal, the defendants did not attack the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit. Instead, they argued that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution did not empower Congress to regulate purely private agreements, but instead authorized Congress only to remove barriers to interstate commerce erected by individual states. They argued also that even if Congress possessed the authority to regulate purely private agreements, banning defendants' cartel would infringe liberty of contract because the defendants' cartel purportedly set reasonable prices. The defendants' last argument was that their cartel did not directly restrain trade but instead was simply a partial restraint that ensured the defendants merely a reasonable rate of return and thus would have been enforceable at common law.

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Peckham, rejected all three arguments and affirmed the decision below. Peckham conceded that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution likely anticipated that the Commerce Clause would mainly authorize Congressional interdiction of state-created barriers to interstate commerce. At the same time, Peckham observed that, in some cases, purely private agreements can have the same economic impact, that is directly restrain commerce among the several states. Moreover, Peckham also held that contracts that directly restrain trade are not the sort of ordinary contracts and combinations that find shelter in liberty of contract. Finally, Peckham held that the defendants' cartel did in fact directly restrain trade Here Peckham quoted extensively from Judge Taft's opinion below, which found, as a matter of fact, that the defendant's cartel set unreasonable prices. See 85 F. 291-93. In particular, Peckham quoted Taft's finding that pipe produced by the cartel could have been produced and delivered to Atlanta for a cost, including a reasonable profit and the cost of transportation, or $17 or $18 per ton, but the cartel instead charged $24.25 per ton.

CASO: UNITED STATE VS. TRANS MISSOURI RAIL ROAD

Es un caso en el cual los ferrocarrileros habían acordado fijar precios para el transporte ferroviario de modo tal que nadie podía bajar esas tarifas, la corte considero esa conducta ilegal Perse, porque violaba la libertad de competencia.

United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897)[1], was a United States Supreme Court case holding that the Sherman Act (which was an antitrust measure that prohibited anticompetitive behavior in commerce) applied to the railroad industry, even though the U.S. Congress had enacted a comprehensive regime of regulations for that injury.

Various railroad companies had formed an organization to regulate prices charged for transportation. The federal government charged these companies with violating the Sherman Act, and the railroad companies replied that they were not in violation of the act because their organization was designed to keep prices low, not to push them higher. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Sherman Act prohibited all such combinations, irrespective of the purpose.

The companies also contended that Congress had not intended the Sherman Act to apply to them, because there were already a wide array of laws governing the railroads. The Court also rejected this argument, noting that no exception was stated in the Sherman Act.

Casos Bolivianos de Franquicias

En cuanto a los casos bolivianos, se puede mencionar el caso de las Farmacias Santa Maria en Santa Cruz. Para ingresar en una franquicia se debe pagar un importe no reembolsable llamado LANDMARK que es una especie de derecho de llave para ingresar a la franquicia, adicionalmente se debe pagar la regalía o royalty emergente del contrato y licencia de uso de marca, el importe de la regalía normalmente esta fijado en el contrato y puede ser 20% de las ganancias anuales del franquiciado. En las franquicias de países como el nuestro, el problema no esta en el landmark sino en el Royalty, si bien resulta cómodo al farnquiciante tener la mayor cantidad de franquiciatario es posible que esto genere un riesgo que puede ser o no puede ser justificado por las regalías, en el caso de países como el nuestro las franquicias tienen justificativo por el bajo rendimiento en relación al mercado mundial. Eso ha ocasionado que franquicias como Mc Donald’s Domino’s Pizza o Microsoft suspendan sus contratos con comerciantes en Bolivia. Estas franquicias no sufren modificaciones, es decir no se adecuan no se sujetan aun nivel de producción, sino que exigen que el productor local se sujete a niveles internacionales lo que en nuestro medio se hace sumamente difícil.

Caso: Bing

El caso Bing se refiere a la franquicia de helados nacida en México con prolongaciones en el mercado americano, la característica es la incursión de la fabricación de helados completamente fuera de la lógica y tradicionalmente convencional. La producción de helados Bing constituye la franquicia más grande de helados en Méjico.

CASO: Holliday Inn.

Cadena de hoteles nacida en los Estados unidos, Holliday Inn se caracteriza por prestar servicios de alojamiento con tasas altamente competitivas en el mercado y prestando servicios como los mejores hoteles, esta franquicia es una de las mas grandes de Estados Unidos, fundada por el señor Keneth Wilson.

Link: http://www.dinero.com.ve/franquicias/holiday.html

CASO: CHICKEN DELIGHT

Chiken Delight es una firma que vende comida rápida de pollos, ellos entregaron en franquicia su servicio a un franquiciatario después de haber llegado a un acuerdo, y después que el franquiciatario compro todos los activos del franquiciatario para poder producir el producto, el franquiciante quiso además que el franquiciado le comprara los pollos, a lo cual se rehusó este, el franquiciatario pretendió basarse en el caso Carvel ice Cream, sin embargo la Corte Americana determino que esta era una franquicia de Bussines format ya que no existía know how de por medio ya que los pollos se los puede comprar de cualquier lado siempre y cuando cumplan con algunos requerimientos y normas establecidas por el franquiciatario.

Link: http://www.chickendelight.com/

CASO: CARVEL ICE CREAM

Carvel dio su producto a un franquiciatario y después de haber acordado los términos del contrato, el franquiciatario pretendió, que carvel le diera la receta para él poder producir los helados, sin embargo el franquiciante se negó a este hecho y le indico al franquiciatario que el le vendería los helados, lo cual el franquiciado recuso, y se fueron a la corte. La corte americana determino que esta era una franquicia solo de producto ya que existía un know how de por medio y este debería seguir en poder del franquiciatario.

Link http://www.carvel.com/

CASO: “QVC” PARAMOUNT COMUNICATIONS VS. QVC NETWORK INC.

Después de que Paramount intento infructuosamente de fusionarse con la Time. Ellos decidieron fusionarse con Viacom, la cual estaba controlada por Summer Redstone (SR). Pero SR era muy experto en HTO’s y realizo una serie de cláusulas que difícilmente dejarían que la Paramount pudiera dejar el trato. Primero la cláusula Non-Shop. Después acordó un Termination Free y por efecto de esta cláusula, si Paramount terminaba el trato anteladamente debía pagar a Viacom 100 MM. Después de este complejo acuerdo apareció QVC y su oferta superaba al de la Paramount. La Corte dejo sin efectos los acuerdos con SR por considerarlos lesivos a los intereses de los accionistas de la Viacom

CASO: “TIME” O PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS VS. TIME INC

Demuestra una defensa por la cual los directores pretenden evitar una compra en efectivo y lo que hacen es ofertar las acciones a otro interesado Warner Bros Inc., la Warner al tomar conocimiento del interés de la Paramount, lega a un acuerdo amigable con la Time para hacer menos atractivo el negocio de la Paramount. AL final la Paramount pidió a la corte la nulidad de la operación pero la corte no considero ilegal la venta, el ingreso de la Warner no se debió a manipulaciones de la Time sino a un interés que subió cuando la oferta de la Paramount fue publica, actualmente el grupo se llama Time Warner.

12. CASO: UNOCAL CORP VS MESA PETROLEUM CO. O EXAMEN UNOCAL

Muestra como los directores tomaron otra iniciativa que es evitar a toda costa el HTO al ver que los futuros miembros del directorio no eran idóneos, los directores evitaron el HTO y la Corte Americana aprobó esa defensa por que entendió que buscaba defender el negocio antes que sus propios intereses y frente a la potencial falta de idoneidad de los futuros directores.

| View | Upload your own

Respuestas al debate de los Hostile Tender Offers CASO: CHEFF VS MATHES

Ante las diversas modalidades de HTO se han planteado algunas soluciones que tienen como base a algunos casos:
CASO: CHEFF VS MATHES. Los directores en la desesperación ante un eminente HTO tomaron como estrategia un MBO, ofreciendo a los accionistas de la Bidder Company, un precio superior al pagado por sus acciones mas un premio evitando que la Bidder Co. Tome el control de la Target Co. Cuando la corte conoció ese hecho, considero que el precio pagado por el directorio de la Target por las acciones de la Bidder Co. Era un precio superior al valor de mercado pero con un fin, el perpetuar a los directores en sus puestos a causa del endeudamiento de la sociedad y la Corte Suprema Americana considero ilegal esta defensa de los directores.

CASO: MORAN VS. HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL INC

CASO: MORAN VS. HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL INC. Esta caso muestra la creación de mecanismos que gatillan cuando se produce una adquisición de la sociedad. En este caso la sociedad adquirida acordó que en el momento de la adquisición los accionistas restantes o remanentes tenían derecho de recibir el doble del precio que se pago por la acción a los anteriores accionistas, este derecho de exigir la compra al doble sé gatillaba apenas hubiera sido concluida la adquisición. El mecanismo se llamo Flip Over incluía en el mecanismo a cualquiera que adquiriera el 20% o hiciera una oferta por el 30%. Y luego participara en la fusión.

CASO BANK SHAMUT – BOSTON BANK

Es una fusión de iguales realizada entre dos conglomerados. Uno el Shamut Nacional Corporation (SNC) y el otro es el Bank of Boston Corporation (BKB). Esta fusión constituye un icono y paradigma de las fusiones modernas, es decir, el ej. De cómo se orientan actualmente las fusiones. La historia comienza con los antecedentes del SNC, sociedad creada en 1836. Su nombre original era el Warran Bank y este banco se fusiono con otro banco llamado Shamut Bank of Boston como primer banco que adquirió. Posteriormente se produjeron 17 adquisiciones de bancos entre 1982-1988. Este conjunto de adquisición cerro con una gran fusión con un banco llamado Hart Fort National Corp, esta fusión era por el equivalente de 14 Billones de dólares. Luego de esta fusión el CEO era el Sr. Joel Alford y la sociedad resultante tenia un gran éxito financiero y organizacional. En 1991 SNC era el mas grande Holding bancario muy fuerte en servicios personales, pero con debilidades en otros campos. Por otro lado esta el Bank of Boston Corporation que tiene sus orígenes en 1784 y se formo sobre la base del Massachusetts Bank. También se sometió a un conjunto de fusiones que pasaron por la adquisición del nombre en 1902 al fusionarse con el First National Bank of Boston, este era uno de los bancos mas poderosos en materia corporativa es decir en banca de empresas, y por el nivel y valor de ambas compañías (La SNC y la BKB) por su envergadura esta fusión se llamo fusión de iguales. Esta fusión se produjo en 1992 teniendo como protagonistas sobresalientes a los CEO’s de ambas compañías. Joel Alford e Ira Stephania, la característica esencial de la fusión fue la propuesta por Ira Sthepania de Boston Bank y esta fue la sinergia. Posteriormente esta se convirtió en el Fleet Bank y actualmente es el Bank of América. Este modelo histórico muestra que la fusión no se rige por parámetros esencialmente de fusión de capital sino por compensación de debilidades y generación de eficiencia.

FIN DEL CAPITULO

CASO: BALDWIN VS. CANFIELD

Establece que la decisión o resolución individual de un director es ilegal y no tiene sustento. En otras palabras el directorio y los directores solidariamente son responsables, pero un director no tiene autoridad.

A board of director has not authority to act except when it is assembled at a board meeting. A separate action, done individually, is not the action of the constituted body of men clothed with corporate power. The power to manage a corporation is vested in the board of directors not as individuals but as one body => canít act individually in the name of the board.

Minority rule: usually if it is in the usual practice the action of one member of the board may be attributed to the board, if the third party had no reason to suspect that the individual director is not acting with authority and that the majority consent is not seriously questioned.

MBCA (1984) ß 8.21

Unless provided otherwise in the articles, an action may be taken without a meeting if it is taken by all the members of the board. All directors may sign a consent form evidencing their approval of the action.

Here, the deed was signed by different directors at different times w/o a board meeting, the court held the deed invalid because the action was taken by one director w/o a director meeting.

CASO: AUER VS. DRESSEL

Caso: Los directores habían tratado de despojar a los accionistas del derecho de expresión y ello era por que los directores controlaban la sociedad y nombraban a la mayoría de los directores, como directores que eran se negaban a convocar a una junta para cambiar esas reglas, la corte rechazo este hecho al considerarlo restrictivo de la liberta de expresión de los accionistas.

Matter of Auer v. Dressel:

When the holders request a special holdersí meeting, when the necessary numbers of voting shares back such a request, and no purpose for the meeting is improper, then the director must call such a meeting.

Holders who are empowered to elect directors can also remove them for cause. And they can also exclude another class of holders from replacing the vacancy when the vacancy in the directors is from that class of holders.

[Z] => President cannot refuse to call holders meeting and the holders cannot dump the director at will, UNLESS for cause.

Auer v. Dressel, Court of Appeals of New York, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954)

The directors of R. Hoe & Co. removed Joseph L. Auer as president. Class A stockholders had the power to elect nine of 11 directors. The bylaws required the president to call a special meeting when asked by a majority of stockholders entitled to vote at such a meeting, so over 55% of class A stockholders asked the new president to call a meeting. The new president refused to call the meeting claiming that none of the stated purposes for the meeting were proper for class A stockholders. Is it proper for the class A stockholders to call a meeting to vote on a resolution indorsing Auer to be reinstated as president? Held Yes. The shareholders can express themselves, even if they cannot by the resolution actually effect the change. Do the class A shareholders have the power to amend the bylaws to authorize replacement of a director only by the class of stockholders represented by the removed director? Held Yes. These particular stockholders have the power to elect and remove nine of the 11 directors with cause, so it is appropriate that they would amend the bylaws to allow themselves to name replacements. Even though the certificate of incorporation allows directors to remove a director on charges, that doesn’t take away the "traditional, inherent power [of the stockholders] to remove their own directors." That class has the power to name nine of the 11 directors, so they should be able to exclude common stockholders from naming their replacements.

Links relacionados:

• law Schools
• Corporations Cases
• Sahreholders Proposals