lunes, 17 de junio de 2013
Tasa nominal
Llamada alicuota y surge del calculo del impuesto por adentro, es decir que el impuesto forma parte del calculo. Así por ejemplo un producto que cuesta 100Bs. Se dice que esta generando un impuesto al valor agregado por una tasa del 13% bajo este concepto el precio del producto sin impuesto seria de 87 Bs. Sin embargo si a 87 se carga 13% no se llega a 100 y esto surge del hecho de que para calcular se ha realizado un calculo por adentro.
sábado, 15 de junio de 2013
Contrato de confidencialidad
También llamado Non Disclosure Agreement contrato por el cual el consultor se obliga a no divulgar no solamente la información recibida por efecto de la consultoría sino también la información que resulte del informe final de consultoría, bajo la alternativa de pagar los daños que se ocasionen por la divulgación de esa información.
martes, 11 de junio de 2013
SWAPS CONCEPTOS BASICOS
Dentro de los varios tipos de swaps desarrollados y creados en el curso de la historia, se han creado los swaps de interés, que son mecanismos de rebaja y modulación del riesgo que pueden originar las tasas de interés y sus variaciones. Como sabemos tradicionalmente se usaban las tasas referenciales como la LIBOR, PRIME RATE, etc., mecanismos para evitar la influencia de estas variaciones normales en el mercado. La cobertura de riego es uno de los aspectos mas importantes en las actividades de los comerciantes y de los industriales. Los swaps de interés se gestionan normalmente por medio de instituciones bancarias, los cuales tienen el objeto de manejar y controlar el riego propio y el de sus clientes.
domingo, 9 de junio de 2013
Afectación y disposición del derecho propietario sobre bienes intangibles
Dadas las características de los bienes intangibles, sería incorrecto afirmar que una persona podría usurpar un bien intangible ajeno apropiándose del soporte donde se encuentra expresado dicho bien. La violación a los derechos de propiedad sobre un bien intangible (propiedad intelectual) solo pueden darse por uso, reproducción o aprovechamiento no autorizado de la creación intelectual protegida, sin importar el derecho propietario del soporte donde se exprese la creación. Dicho uso no autorizado se entiende como cualquier acto dirigido a obtener provecho propio en perjuicio de su real propietario. Todo ilícito que implique un acto de tenencia, posesión o dominio FÍSICO de bienes es inaplicable para la realidad de los bienes intangibles (arrendamiento, anticresis, garantías prendarias o hipotecarias, robo, hurto, apropiación, daño simple o calificado, etc).
La práctica comercial, ha excluído dichas formas de afectación y disposición para las creaciones intelectuales. Los actos de disposición de bienes intangibles se regulan , principalmente en materia de Propiedad Industrial, mediante la transferencia (traslación del derecho propietario) o el contrato de licencia de uso, cuya vigencia está siempre sujeta a una condición formal de registro (contrato formal o solemne). En materia de Derechos de Autor, existen reglas especiales para la disposición de los derechos patrimoniales (contratos de edición, etc.)
La práctica comercial, ha excluído dichas formas de afectación y disposición para las creaciones intelectuales. Los actos de disposición de bienes intangibles se regulan , principalmente en materia de Propiedad Industrial, mediante la transferencia (traslación del derecho propietario) o el contrato de licencia de uso, cuya vigencia está siempre sujeta a una condición formal de registro (contrato formal o solemne). En materia de Derechos de Autor, existen reglas especiales para la disposición de los derechos patrimoniales (contratos de edición, etc.)
viernes, 7 de junio de 2013
Estructura básica del mercado de valores: Agencia de Bolsa
También llamada Brookers, son los intermediarios entre el inversionista y el productor de bienes y servicios, en realidad no son los agentes quienes definen donde invertirán los recursos si no son únicamente quienes ejecutan las instrucciones recibidas del inversionista, al contrario de lo que sucede con la banca, la cual asume riesgos por su cuenta, un agente es fiscalizado por el mercado de valores.
miércoles, 5 de junio de 2013
CASO: UNITED STATUS VS ADISSION PIPE
Addison Pipe era una compañía de fabricación de ductos que había participado en la iniciativa de celebrar un contrato entre fabricantes de ductos, por el cual los fabricantes se distribuían el mercado, de modo tal que cada fabricante se quedaba con una porción de mercado que le pertenecía en las licitaciones que convocaba el Estado, resultaba fácil verificar el cumplimiento del acuerdo porque las licitaciones eran publicas y se sabían el precio que las partes ofrecían, ese precio siempre era superior al precio que ofrecía aquel fabricante que no era parte del acuerdo, al verse perjudicado denuncio esa conducta.
The defendants were pipemakers who were operating in agreement, so that when municipalities offered projects available to the lowest bidder, all companies but the one designated would overbid, thus guaranteeing the success of the designated low bidder (although it was still possible for a company outside the group to win).
The defendants asserted that this was a reasonable restraint of trade, and that the Sherman Act could not have meant to prevent such restraints.
Court of Appeals (6th circuit)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that it would be impossible for the Sherman Act to prohibit every restraint of trade, for that would even encompass employment contracts which, by their nature, restrain the employee from working elsewhere during the time that they are being paid to work for the employer. Therefore, reasonable restraints were permitted, but this would only apply if the restraint was ancillary to the main purpose of the agreement. No conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless:
it is ancillary to the main purpose of the lawful contract; and
it is necessary to protect enjoyment of legit fruits or to protect from dangers.
If the primary purpose is to restrain trade, then the agreement is invalid, and in this case, the restraint was direct, and therefore invalid.
The opinion was written by Chief Judge William Howard Taft (who later became President of the United States, and then Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court). Taft's reasoning was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court as the proper interpretation of the Sherman Act.
Supreme Court
This case was appealed to the Supreme Court as Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).[1] However, on appeal, the defendants did not attack the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit. Instead, they argued that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution did not empower Congress to regulate purely private agreements, but instead authorized Congress only to remove barriers to interstate commerce erected by individual states. They argued also that even if Congress possessed the authority to regulate purely private agreements, banning defendants' cartel would infringe liberty of contract because the defendants' cartel purportedly set reasonable prices. The defendants' last argument was that their cartel did not directly restrain trade but instead was simply a partial restraint that ensured the defendants merely a reasonable rate of return and thus would have been enforceable at common law.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Peckham, rejected all three arguments and affirmed the decision below. Peckham conceded that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution likely anticipated that the Commerce Clause would mainly authorize Congressional interdiction of state-created barriers to interstate commerce. At the same time, Peckham observed that, in some cases, purely private agreements can have the same economic impact, that is directly restrain commerce among the several states. Moreover, Peckham also held that contracts that directly restrain trade are not the sort of ordinary contracts and combinations that find shelter in liberty of contract. Finally, Peckham held that the defendants' cartel did in fact directly restrain trade Here Peckham quoted extensively from Judge Taft's opinion below, which found, as a matter of fact, that the defendant's cartel set unreasonable prices. See 85 F. 291-93. In particular, Peckham quoted Taft's finding that pipe produced by the cartel could have been produced and delivered to Atlanta for a cost, including a reasonable profit and the cost of transportation, or $17 or $18 per ton, but the cartel instead charged $24.25 per ton.
The defendants were pipemakers who were operating in agreement, so that when municipalities offered projects available to the lowest bidder, all companies but the one designated would overbid, thus guaranteeing the success of the designated low bidder (although it was still possible for a company outside the group to win).
The defendants asserted that this was a reasonable restraint of trade, and that the Sherman Act could not have meant to prevent such restraints.
Court of Appeals (6th circuit)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that it would be impossible for the Sherman Act to prohibit every restraint of trade, for that would even encompass employment contracts which, by their nature, restrain the employee from working elsewhere during the time that they are being paid to work for the employer. Therefore, reasonable restraints were permitted, but this would only apply if the restraint was ancillary to the main purpose of the agreement. No conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless:
it is ancillary to the main purpose of the lawful contract; and
it is necessary to protect enjoyment of legit fruits or to protect from dangers.
If the primary purpose is to restrain trade, then the agreement is invalid, and in this case, the restraint was direct, and therefore invalid.
The opinion was written by Chief Judge William Howard Taft (who later became President of the United States, and then Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court). Taft's reasoning was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court as the proper interpretation of the Sherman Act.
Supreme Court
This case was appealed to the Supreme Court as Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).[1] However, on appeal, the defendants did not attack the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit. Instead, they argued that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution did not empower Congress to regulate purely private agreements, but instead authorized Congress only to remove barriers to interstate commerce erected by individual states. They argued also that even if Congress possessed the authority to regulate purely private agreements, banning defendants' cartel would infringe liberty of contract because the defendants' cartel purportedly set reasonable prices. The defendants' last argument was that their cartel did not directly restrain trade but instead was simply a partial restraint that ensured the defendants merely a reasonable rate of return and thus would have been enforceable at common law.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Peckham, rejected all three arguments and affirmed the decision below. Peckham conceded that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution likely anticipated that the Commerce Clause would mainly authorize Congressional interdiction of state-created barriers to interstate commerce. At the same time, Peckham observed that, in some cases, purely private agreements can have the same economic impact, that is directly restrain commerce among the several states. Moreover, Peckham also held that contracts that directly restrain trade are not the sort of ordinary contracts and combinations that find shelter in liberty of contract. Finally, Peckham held that the defendants' cartel did in fact directly restrain trade Here Peckham quoted extensively from Judge Taft's opinion below, which found, as a matter of fact, that the defendant's cartel set unreasonable prices. See 85 F. 291-93. In particular, Peckham quoted Taft's finding that pipe produced by the cartel could have been produced and delivered to Atlanta for a cost, including a reasonable profit and the cost of transportation, or $17 or $18 per ton, but the cartel instead charged $24.25 per ton.
lunes, 3 de junio de 2013
Precio Final
Es el resultado de la suma del precio neto mas impuestos. El precio final incluye impuestos lo que no sucede en otros sistemas como el americano en el cual solo ciertos impuestos forman parte del precio final, el cual es distinto al precio del consumidor. El precio al consumidor normalmente no incluye los impuestos que no se impongan en el estado en el cual se venda el producto. Al final un producto vendido en Florida tiene un precio al consumidor distinto al precio que se vende en Pensilvania. En nuestro país el precio final debe incluir siempre los impuestos, y no es posible agregarlos al final de la venta, esta conducta es ilegal.
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